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Introduction
The U.N. supported Principles of Responsible Management 
Education (PRiME) initiative aspires to transform the rela-
tionship between business and society by ensuring that the 
next generation of business leaders are shaped by manage-
ment education that conceptualises businesses as generators of 
sustainable value (UN Global Compact, 2007). This note argues 
that an economics curriculum designed in accordance with 
these principles can be a powerful tool to achieve this objective 
and proposes some key elements of such a curriculum.
Contemporary economics offers a wide range of perspectives 
on the interrelationships between business and society and thus 
on what constitutes responsible management in a specific con-
text. The most simplistic of these perspectives implies that profit 
maximizing firms alone can deliver outcomes which maximize 
economic welfare. In this view, responsible management is 
reduced to the single-minded pursuit of profits. However, more 
nuanced views of the relationships between firms and the socie-
ties in which they operate, such as those that allow for monopoly 
power in product markets, monopsony power in labour mar-
kets, for the presence of externalities in the production of goods 
and services, for a role of the state in the provision of pub-
lic goods, and for the existence of market failures more gener-
ally, offer profoundly different advice to aspiring practitioners 
of responsible management. Thus, a well-rounded management 
curriculum should give due emphasis to these more nuanced 
economic perspectives.
A common practice in the design of economics curricula is to 
present theory in layers of increasing complexity. However, a 
constraint that often faces economics educators on management 
degrees is that such degrees typically require students to engage 
with economics only at the introductory level, usually in large 
cohorts that include students on a variety of other degree pro-
grammes. In this context, a layered economics curriculum that is 
focused on the needs of specialist economics students, may do a 
disservice to students on other degree programmes as the narra-
tives that emerge from the most simplistic economic models usu-
ally overemphasize the role of self-interest in generating value 
for society. Thus, a poorly designed introductory economics 
module can risk falling short of PRiME’s objectives by fail-
ing to prepare aspiring practitioners of responsible manage-
ment with an education that covers a diversity of views on the 
relationship between business and society.
This note offers a perspective on the design of an introductory 
economics curriculum that is tailored to addresses the forego-
ing concerns. Such a curriculum will of course celebrate the 
power of profit-seeking firms to generate growth and prosper-
ity, a power that is characteristic of the modern global economy. 
But it will also make future business leaders aware of the numer-
ous contexts in which an overly narrow focus on self-interest 
can impair a firm’s ability to generate sustainable value for 
society. The next section reflects on how the principles of self-
interest and profit maximization can be taught to foster respon-
sible management practices. The note then goes on to discuss a 
number of specific economic models that can form the basis of a 
15-credit introductory economics sequence that will equip 
aspiring business leaders with the skills they will need to build 
profitable enterprises that also fulfil the objective of generating 
sustainable value as envisioned by PRiME.
Narratives of self-interest and responsibility
The idea that narrow self-interest should motivate firms is not 
new. Intellectual curiosity around the sufficiency of self-interest 
in producing socially desirable outcomes goes back to the 
inception of the economic sciences. As is well known, in 
An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 
Adam Smith observed that “It is not from the benevolence of the 
butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner but 
from their regard to their own interest,” and “By pursuing his 
own interest he frequently promotes that of society more effec-
tually than when it really intends to promote it” (Smith, 1776). 
These quotes are often included in introductory econom-
ics lectures to motivate the central insights of the theory of the 
perfectly competitive firm.
The perfectly competitive benchmark presents an elegant theo-
retical exposition in which profit maximization as the sole 
motivating force for firm behaviour is not only desirable, but 
socially optimal. Despite the alluring simplicity of this argument, 
economic theory circumscribes its relevance to a very nar-
row domain, i.e. where firms are small in relation to the mar-
ket in which they operate, where products are homogenous, 
where there are no externalities or public goods and where the 
provision of information is perfect. Indeed, Smith himself 
was acutely aware of the potential for non-competitive out-
comes to arise in practice1. Nonetheless, the narratives that 
emerge from this theory hold very broad – arguably too broad 
– influence in social, political, and business decision making 
and can undermine the effectiveness of management education 
that is designed to nurture responsible business practices.
There are several steps that educators can take to counteract 
these forces. The perfectly competitive model should be pre-
sented as one abstract craterisation of firm behaviour, among 
many others. Attention should be drawn to the extreme nature 
of the assumptions on which the model is built to reinforce its 
hypothetical nature. Due care should be taken to explain to stu-
dents that it is neither the model that most closely approxi-
mates reality, nor the workhorse model used in applied work. 
Rather, this note argues that it should be presented as a peda-
gogic tool that provides a useful point of departure from which 
other, more sophisticated models can be built.
Alternative models of the firm and responsible 
management
A constructive and engaging way to challenge the laissez 
faire narratives that emerge from the perfectly competitive 
benchmark and the potentially unsustainable management 
1
 Also in The Wealth of Nations Smith writes, “People of the same trade 
seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation 
ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise 
prices.”
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practices that they can imply, is to carefully and critically analyse 
the assumptions on which the model is built. The implications 
of relaxing each of the assumptions for the practice of respon-
sible management can be modelled in turn, thereby forming 
the basis of an economics unit that engages meaningfully with 
PRiME’s objectives. This note now turns to cataloguing some of 
these critiques and their implications for aspiring management 
professionals.
Market power in product markets: generating value?
The PRiME initiative casts the role of a firm as an instrument 
that generates value for society. In the perfectly competitive 
model, profit maximization achieves this objective only as each 
firm is assumed to be small in relation to the market in which it 
operates, and products are assumed to be homogenous. Together, 
these assumptions imply that individual firms are price tak-
ers and so have no market power. This complete lack of mar-
ket power underpins the allocative and productive efficiency 
(Begg et al., 2014) of this theorised market structure, and thus 
the result that profit maximizing firms generate the most value 
for society. By contrast, in models that allow firms to exer-
cise some degree of market power, a relatively straightforward 
diagrammatic exposition can show that profit maximization can 
no longer be relied upon to allocate resources efficiently (Begg 
et al., 2014). In general, when firms exercise market power, they 
can increase profits by raising prices through restricting out-
put. Thus, market power implies that firms produce too little 
output, relative to the quantity that would maximize social 
welfare.
A management education that aspires to fulfil PRiME’s objec-
tives should take care to reinforce this insight. In firms that 
exercise a considerable degree of market power, the objec-
tive of profit maximization no longer fully aligns with that 
of maximizing value for society. Thus, the managers of these 
firms need to be prepared to make judgements that on the mar-
gin trade-off the degree of profitability of their firm against the 
amount of value the firm generates for society.
During the Covid-19 pandemic (which is ongoing as of the writ-
ing of this document), it is not difficult to think of markets in 
which restricting the supply of a good or increasing prices may 
reasonably be deemed undesirable. The markets for healthcare 
and life-saving drugs present themselves as obvious and vivid 
examples. But the recent shortages of more ordinary goods 
such as flour and toilet paper in U.K. also provide examples 
where firms have not raised prices out of regard for the public 
interest (Sanders, 2020).
Market power in labour markets: behaving responsibly?
Firms have responsibilities to their shareholders and their cus-
tomers, but also to the workers they employ. In the perfectly 
competitive labour market assumed in introductory econom-
ics classes, there exists a going market wage at which both 
buyers and sellers of labour are price-takers. In this simplistic 
model, a binding minimum wage will reduce employment (Card 
& Krueger, 1994). In reality, the relationship between workers 
and employers is usually characterised by an asymmetry in 
bargaining power which favours the employer. The presence 
of such monopsony power can enable firms to extract rents 
from their employees, where these excess profits come at the 
cost of workers whose households are left worse off (Card & 
Krueger, 1994). If firms throughout the economy behave in 
this way, then low wages and high business profits can exac-
erbate inequality in a society (Lee, 1999). Without the ben-
efit of an economics education that explicitly studies these 
forces, even well-intentioned managers wishing to protect their 
most vulnerable workers from unemployment may act out of a 
misguided hostility to minimum wage legislation.
A further nuance of this model is that the asymmetry in mar-
ket power between a firm and its employees is likely to 
be most pronounced among unskilled workers at the bot-
tom of the wage distribution as these workers are themselves 
least likely to exercise market power (Card & Kreuger, 1994). 
For these workers, a countervailing force to the asymmetry in 
bargaining power, such as a union, may help improve wages and 
working conditions and thereby support responsible business 
practice.
To ensure that future business leaders are equipped to make 
informed decisions regarding their workers, an econom-
ics curriculum motivated by PRiME should include the basic 
insights of the monopsony model. Doing so will enable the 
next generation of management professionals to adopt better 
hiring practices and to understand the important role that mini-
mum wage legislation and unions can play in protecting their 
vulnerable workers.
Externalities and the legitimacy of regulation
A key stated objective of the UN’s PRiME initiative is to pro-
mote sustainability. One of the ways in which the perfectly 
competitive benchmark does a disservice to sustainability is 
by assuming away the possibility of externalities. As can be 
simply illustrated in a demand and supply diagram, the social 
welfare maximizing property of the perfectly competitive bench-
mark depends crucially on the assumption that there are no 
externalities (Begg et al., 2014). The existence of externalities 
– effects of a transaction that do not fall on the parties engaging 
in the transaction, that are not captured by the price mechanism 
– will again place demands on tomorrow’s decision makers that 
an overly simplistic economics education will fail to prepare 
them for. Managers of firms that produce substantive negative 
externalities who strive to generate sustainable value for soci-
ety will need to make difficult choices that trade-off firm prof-
its against the harm that is done to society in the pursuit of 
these profits.
Proponents of a laissez faire system point to forces that may 
effectively align the incentives of firms with those of society 
more broadly, even in the presence of externalities (Hemphill, 
1992). A firm that causes harm to the environment may suf-
fer reputational damage which in turn affects profits, whereas 
a firm that proactively utilises more sustainable methods of 
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production may be more attractive to customers. In other words, 
an informed and socially engaged consumer base may pro-
vide firms with incentives to regulate themselves, thus allowing 
managers to focus simply on profit maximation.
This line of reasoning itself depends on some strong assump-
tions that are unlikely to be valid in the real world. First, it 
may be costly for consumers to gather reliable information on 
the nature and extent of damages inflicted on the environment 
by firms. Second, even if consumers have the appropriate infor-
mation, there is no mechanism that suggests that the extent to 
which they penalize polluting firms or reward sustainable ones 
will be proportionate to the extent of the externality. Indeed, 
the 2015 Volkswagen emissions scandal (Hotten, 2015 pro-
vides a useful summary), where the company was found to have 
installed devices that were designed to cheat emissions tests 
on entire ranges of vehicles, illustrates that in practice firms 
may go to considerable lengths to actively mislead the pub-
lic about the extent of the damage they are causing. It may 
also be argued that the long-term penalty exacted by market 
forces on Volkswagen for a relatively severe breach of consum-
er’s trust (cheating vehicles produced emissions levels 40 times 
those permitted by law) were relatively short lived, with share 
prices first returning to the pre-scandal levels in November 
2017, a little over two years since the news of emissions 
cheating broke (Bryant, 2017).
The presence of externalities thus implies an important role 
for the state to play in imposing and maintaining regulatory 
standards. A simplistic economics curriculum that overem-
phasises laissez faire narratives will encourage business lead-
ers to argue that such standards are ‘burdensome regulations’ 
which ‘get in the way of business’, phrases that have been com-
mon refrains among business lobby groups, with those that 
advocated in favour of Brexit providing a recent example. An 
economics educator designing a curriculum in line with PRiME 
should take care to invert this narrative and celebrate appropriate 
regulation as enabling force towards sustainable businesses.
Public goods and the legitimacy of taxation
While it is certainly true that market forces have delivered 
incredible prosperity to the modern world, an economics cur-
riculum consistent with PRiME should recognise that they 
have not done so in isolation. The market system relies on the 
state to provide functioning legal and regulatory institutions, 
as alluded to above, but also infrastructure such as ports, 
roads and highways, as well as essential inputs to the human 
capital employed by firms such as healthcare and schooling. 
Therefore, sustainable business depends on a sustainable state 
apparatus, which in turn must be funded by a sustainable level of 
taxation.
This reality – that markets can only function in the pres-
ence of a host of goods and services provided by the state and 
funded by taxation – is formally circumvented in the perfectly 
competitive benchmark by assuming that there are no public 
goods or externalities (Begg et al., 2014). Indeed, the logic of 
the perfectly competitive benchmark goes further, and concludes 
that taxes induce an ‘excess burden’ and a ‘deadweight welfare 
loss’ on society (Begg et al., 2014). While an economics cur-
riculum should of course acknowledge the distortions induced 
by taxes, a curriculum that supports PRiME’s objectives must 
go further and explain the value added by strong and appro-
priately funded government agencies, both to society in gen-
eral and to the business climate in particular. Indeed, the current 
understanding of economic growth processes suggests that 
the quality of a country’s institutions is the most important 
determinant of long-term growth and prosperity (Acemoglu 
& Robinson, 2012).
These arguments are not just theoretical curiosities, but the sub-
ject of heated contemporary public debate that a responsible 
economics curriculum would do well to engage with. A major 
battle line in the recent U.K. election was the rate at which 
corporations would be obliged to pay taxes on their profits 
(Adam, 2019 provides an informative summary). A number 
of cases where large corporations such as Amazon and Apple 
have been able to legally reduce their tax bills in the U.S. and 
U.K. have also generated considerable media scrutiny (for 
example Sherman, 2019). While it is certainly advantageous 
for firms in the short run to minimize their tax burdens, such 
strategies are likely to prove neither responsible nor sustain-
able. In the long run, an impoverished state may struggle to 
provide the quality public services that businesses depend on. 
The U.K. government’s Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme 
provides a vivid contemporary example of the immense value 
that businesses can reap from strong and properly funded 
public initiatives (Dias et al., 2020).
Conclusion
The UN-backed PRiME initiative calls for businesses to inter-
act with the societies in ethical and sustainable ways. The nar-
ratives that emerge from simplistic economic models that are 
often encountered in introductory economics modules on the 
typical management curriculum can be at odds with these 
objectives and can leave aspiring practitioners of responsi-
ble management unprepared for the difficult trade-offs they 
are likely to face in their careers. This note has argued that 
a careful critique of each of the assumptions that underpin 
these simplistic narratives and an exposition of the alternative 
models that arise from each critique can provide a basis for an 
engaging economics curriculum that will better equip the next 
generation of managers to make informed decisions between 
the extent of firm profits and other considerations such as 
the welfare of customers, the wages of workers, and making 
a just contribution to the functions of the state that enable busi-
ness to flourish. Such an economics curriculum will help 
business schools to deliver a management education that 
fulfils the ambitious objectives envisioned by PRiME.
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